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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1951 TERM
manifested the intention not to be bound until the writing shall
have been executed,7 in which case the agreement must be assented
to as written before it becomes binding.8 Signing and delivery
commonly are sufficient proof of assent.' Actual physical delivery
of the instrument is not always necessary, since assent may be
shown in various ways. 10 But where the intention is that the
writing shall take effect only upon delivery, no contract exists
until the document is delivered."
The instant case clearly shows that where the intention of the
parties is not to be bound until delivery of the formal document,
the actual signing and retention of that document, coupled with
an objection to the manner of payment of the purchase price, is
not an acceptance or delivery of the writing, even though no objection was made to the document as written.
Offer and Acceptanwe
It is not uncommon that parties choose to completely ignore
an offer. The difficulty is that silence may be tantamount to acceptance. In Schultz & Co. v. Camden Fire I. Ass'n.,12 the plaintiff alleged that defendant insurer by its agent had orally agreed
over the telephone to transfer a certain policy covering plaintiff's
1922 Mack truck to his 1933 Mack truck. Subsequent to this alleged
agreement to transfer and insure, the 1933 Mack truck was stolen.
Plaintiff now seeks recovery under the theft clause of the policy.
The plaintiff's agent testified that she had mailed a post card with
the motor number of the 1933 Mack to the agent of the defendant,.
after telephoning a person who said she was the secretary of the
defendant's agent.- The telephone conver'ation was excluded as
it was not shown .that it was with a person qualified to bind the
defendant. The Court of Appeals held that when an application
for insurance is made, the silence of the insurer without other
circumstances does not operate as an acceptance. As a matter of
law, the plaintiff failed to prove acceptance.
7. Commercial Telegraph Co. v. Smith, 47 Hun. 494 (N. Y. 1888); 1 Wnxiszox,
CoirrnAcTs § 28A (rev. ed. 1936).
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§30 (1951).

9. 1 CoRBiN, op. cit. supra n. 8.

10. Sarasohn v. Kamaiky, 193 N. Y. 203, 86 N. E. 20 (1908). Simply reading
over the terms may not be enough; even signing the written contract and retaining possession" of it may not express a sufficient assent. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Royal, 30 Ga.
App. 706, 199 S. E. 339 (1923).
11. Dietz v. Parish, 79 N. Y. 520, 523 (1880).
12. 304 N. Y. 143, 106 N. E. 2d 273 (1952).
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Generally, silence cannot be construed as acceptance of an4
offer,13 for "assent" which is purely mental is too ambiguous.'
The offeror has no power to force the offeree to act in order to
reject the offer. 5 The general rule is that delay by an insurer in
acting upon an application for insurance in itself is not to be
construed as an acceptance of the offer." But the silent retention
of a renewal policy by an insured will operate as acceptance where
previous dealings -an shown.' 7 Likewise, unreasonable delay in
notifying an applicant of rejection of a solicited policy will bind
the insurer.'8 Evidence of usage in a particular trade is admissible with other circumstances to show an assent from silence."
The burden of proof is on the party who asserts the existence of
the policy."
The plaintiff in the instant case simply failed to show facts
sufficient to bring his case within the exceptions to the general
rule.
Statute of Frauds
An oral agreement may be valid as such, yet unenforceable
because by its terms it cannot be fully performed within one year
from its making.21 In Nat Nal Service Stations v. Wolf,22 the
action was for money due upon an oral contract which provided
that so long as the plaintiff purchased his requirements of gasoline
through the defendant, plaintiff would be paid a certain rebate.
The defendant set up the Statute of Frauds in answer and moved
for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, three judges dissenting, held that the agreement did not fall within the scope of
13. Lee v. Woodward, 259 N. Y. 149, 181 N. E. 81 (1932).
14. Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103, 119 (N. Y. 1830); White v. Corlies, 46 N. Y.
467 (1871) ; 1 CoRBnr, op. cit. § 72 (1951).
15. More v. N. Y..B. F. Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 537, 547, 29 N. E. 757, 759 (1892).
16. More v. N. Y. B. F. Ins. Co., supra n. 15;
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§ 64 (1930).

17. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ehrlich, 122 Misc. 682, 203 N. Y.. Supp. 434

(Sup. Ct. 1924).

18. Thompson v. Postal Life Ins. Co., 226 N. Y. 363, 123 N. E. 750 (1919).
19. Rose Inn Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 258 N. Y. 51, 179 N. E. 256

(1930).

20. Lavine v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 260 N. Y. 399, 410, 183 N. E. 897, 900 (1933).
21. N. Y. Pmts. PRoP. LAw § 31 (1.): "Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed
by the party to be charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise
or undertaking; (1.) By its terms is not to be performed within one year from the
making thereof. . ." "Year" is defined in GENmIAL CONSTRUCTION LAW § 58.
22. 304 N. Y. 332, 107 N. E. 2d 473 (1952).

